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Depression and Moral Health: A Response to the 
Commentary  
Mike W. Martin  
 
S. Nassir Ghaemi tells us that whereas "neurologists are sometimes accused of admiring 
disease rather than treating it," psychiatrists seek to cure disease even when they do not 
understand it. At the same time, he notes that Freud had both theoretical and practical 
interests that occasionally point in different directions, and psychiatrists have learned that 
theoretical understanding of the sources of suffering does not always translate directly into 
useful clinical practice. For their part, philosophers are often criticized for indulging in 
armchair speculation that yields neither empirical understanding nor practical efficacy. 
Writing as a philosopher in "Depression: Illness, Insight, and Identity," I had hoped to 
engage both scientific and therapeutic interests while linking them to humanistic concerns 
about values. Ghaemi's emphasis is primarily therapeutic--to help, to heal--but he seems 
generally sympathetic to my goal of integrating moral and therapeutic perspectives. I 
benefited from his cautions about the need to pursue that integration with close attention to 
therapeutic imperatives.  
My essay is part of a larger project of interweaving morality and therapy as applied to an 
array of human problems, or rather of elaborating on an integration that has already evolved 
in our society, and which now permeates self-help literature, talk shows, sermons, and 
much psychotherapy (Martin 1999b). This integration resonates with Plato's daring intuition 
in Republic that morality and mental health are fundamentally linked through a concept of 
moral health. Moral health is something more than a metaphor. It refers to active capacities 
that are essential for both moral life and psychological coping. But Plato went too far when 
he equated virtue and mental health: "Virtue is as it were the health and comeliness and 
well-being of the soul, as wickedness is disease, deformity, and weakness" (1945, trans. 
Cornford). So did humanistic psychologists, such as Erich Fromm, who attempted to derive 
moral principles from psychological facts (1947). Certainly we must not make moral 
judgments about dementia, consider episodic wrongdoing simply pathological, or lapse into 
the patronizing notion that the higher reaches of moral commitment are merely signs of 
sound health. Nevertheless, I am convinced that Plato glimpsed a larger truth than his critics 
allow (Kenny 1973).  
Certainly we need to dissolve any rigid dichotomy between moral and therapeutic 
perspectives on depression, while still appreciating that different practical purposes warrant 
different emphases. Two powerful trends have undermined the moral/therapeutic dichotomy 
during the twentieth century, and yet have also made it difficult to see [End Page 295] 
where we now stand. On one hand, the therapeutic trend has medicalized moral problems 
by approaching them in terms of health and therapy. On the other, the unmasking trend 
reveals that therapy itself embodies moral values, thereby debunking its pretension to 
function as a morally neutral replacement for morality. Both trends are at work, for 
example, in the case of alcoholism.  
Alcoholism is a disease, according to the dominant view in the therapeutic community. 
Citizens and law enforcement agencies, however, continue to regard alcohol abuse as 
something for which individuals should be held accountable. Furthermore, Alcoholics 
Anonymous, the most popular form of alcoholism therapy, conjoins an insistence that 
alcoholism is a disease with moral (and religious) values about accepting personal 
responsibility. In my view, alcoholism is typically both a sickness and something which 
involves wrongdoing (Martin 1999a). It is a sickness insofar as it constitutes impaired 
agency, and it is concerned with wrongdoing insofar as it violates responsibilities to care for 
one's health and to be accountable for one's drinking behavior. Responsibility does not 
vanish once alcoholism has ravaged one's capacity directly to control drinking, for even 
then there remains a duty on the alcoholic's part to seek and to cooperate with available 
therapeutic help. Nevertheless, the different social constituencies dealing with alcoholics 
have strikingly different emphases: therapists emphasize nonjudgmental helping, law 
enforcement personnel accentuate punishment for alcohol-related crimes, insurance 
companies focus on alcoholism's cost liabilities, and legislators formulate laws that provide 
incentives for responsible drinking behavior. All of these emphases overlap at various 
junctures, and as a society, we need a comprehensive perspective that renders them 
coherent.  
To look at another example, analogous differences in emphasis are inevitable and even 
desirable in thinking about depression, given the varying and sometimes conflicting 
concerns of sufferers, agents coping with problems, health care providers, theoreticians in 
psychiatry and the social sciences, groups that pay for medical care, and the depressed 
person's family and community. But again, like alcoholism, we need a comprehensive 
vision of the interplay of illness and insight, pathology and personal meaning, and health 
and moral values in depression. Like alcohol dependency, depression generates questions 
about responsibility. As a general point, recently noted by Lawrence Becker, both mental 
and moral health exclude the crippling forms of severe depression; they exclude any of "the 
basic personality tenors (phobias, distrust, pessimism, depression) that paralyze agency or 
render agents unable to feel or express empathy, or unable to take a benevolent interest in 
others" (Becker 1998, 104). What I said about depression impairing autonomy is germane 
to responsibility issues, but my primary focus was elsewhere--on personal meaning and 
values.  
Ghaemi rightly insists that severe pathological depression "almost always interferes with 
the free, rational exercise of moral agency due to cognitive distortions." Equally important, 
he insists that severe depression needs treatment, and that its value aspects should not 
sanction avoiding help--a dangerous practice that results in part from the cognitive and 
emotional distortions involved in severe depression, and in part from the continuing social 
stigma of mental illness. All of these points are consistent with what I said in discussing 
Peter Kramer, but they deserve the emphasis Ghaemi gives to them. Ghaemi is also on 
target when he says that I failed to distinguish between insights that occur during or after a 
state of depression. Severe depression is perhaps rarely a source of insights while it lasts, 
given the emotional and cognitive inhibition it causes. Mill's insights came after, and in 
light of his suffering, not during it.  
Value judgments enter the discussion in another way. Ghaemi outlines the "depressive 
realism" approach to understanding depression, an approach that finds some correlation 
between a state of mild depression and a realistic grasp of the world. I alluded to that 
literature without emphasizing it. If anything, I discussed psychoanalytic perspectives more 
extensively, while also taking account of biochemical and cognitive-behavioral approaches. 
My themes cut across the varied psychological-psychiatric perspectives, and I did not 
intend to make a "conceptual argument" for associating depression with insight, especially 
if "insight" connotes accurate perception. [End Page 296] Ghaemi cites his own and others' 
studies suggesting that insight is correlated at most with the milder forms of depression, and 
that finding is consistent with my views.  
I emphasize again, however, that my paper dealt with identity and values more than with 
"insights" into facts about the world. Empirical studies tend to focus on how depression 
affects one's knowledge of facts ("reality testing") and to neglect value judgments and their 
connections with one's changes in identity and wider perspectives on life. Value judgments 
can be studied empirically, but only as to: (i) how depression shapes individuals' beliefs 
about values (rather than whether the values themselves are valid); and (ii) the extent to 
which those value beliefs are adaptive or socially effective, according to a given standard. 
Hence, empirical studies would help us better understand when depression is beneficial 
("adaptive") or harmful only if we begin with value assumptions that have not themselves 
been proven empirically. Moreover, depression-linked changes in a person's values and 
identity need not be changes for the better, contrary to the impression my essay may have 
created. Autonomy and authenticity do not always produce more substantive moral 
behaviors.  
Actually, Ghaemi makes a number of extremely interesting observations about depression 
and values. Whereas I emphasized personal meaning, while taking some note of Mill's 
contributions to the history of ethics, Ghaemi shifts to social and political results. He 
discusses the coping and social contributions of depression, even the occasional political 
and military value of presidents and generals who suffered from something far more severe 
than normal depression. Coping has normative connotations in that it presupposes a 
framework of what counts as proper social adjustment; for example, seeking to win a war 
rather than shunning war as pacifists would urge. Ghaemi also makes illuminating 
comments about the coping value of selective ignorance and inattention. I would add that 
those comments pertain to many more human conditions than depression. For example, they 
relate to understanding and morally assessing self-deception (Martin 1986; Lockard and 
Paulhus 1988; Taylor 1989).  
Although Ghaemi finds my discussion of the moral aspects of therapy apt, perhaps more 
needs to be said. My blending of moral and therapeutic perspectives tends to favor therapies 
that complement medication with counseling. Although such therapy is still common, it is 
increasingly at risk because of the relative convenience and lower cost of medication alone 
as compared to counseling services. A biopsychosocial--and moral--understanding of 
human beings should lead us to celebrate pharmaceutical treatments while still continuing 
to appreciate the value explorations that play a key role in psychotherapy.  
Finally, Ghaemi challenges my suggestion that most depression is not a sickness. He says 
this claim is an empirical assertion subject to scientific investigation, and he doubts whether 
it will be confirmed. I would note a few complexities in conducting such studies. Empirical 
investigations need to begin with plausible and agreed-upon definitions of what depression 
is, something which neither Ghaemi nor I offered. (I only cited the DSM-IV definition of 
Major Depressive Disorder.) When I suggested that most depression is not a sickness, I had 
in mind that depression (as distinct from sadness or fatigue but overlapping with despair) is 
a mood of low spirits or dejection centered around a sense of worthlessness or hopelessness, 
either about life as a whole or about specific engagements with the world. I also noted how 
Aaron Beck (1967) restricted the term depression to abnormal states, and I suspect the 
everyday work of psychiatrists might prompt similar biases in acknowledging the frequency 
of "normal" depression. In addition, empirical studies must rely on a plausible definition of 
psychopathology or mental disorder. Here we should be careful in how we respond to the 
cultural trend of associating mental health with high self-esteem, confidence, and happiness 
in ways that automatically render depression suspect. If we use a broad definition of 
depression combined with the current DSM-IV definition of mental disorders, then perhaps 
my claim is not implausible.  
Perhaps we can draw a rough analogy with jealousy, as found in erotic love and a great 
many other areas of life. Many a lover will testify that intense jealousy is unpleasant, albeit 
not exactly [End Page 297] in the way depression is (although the two can be found in 
tandem). Some jealousy is pathological, but much of it is normal and healthy. It is plausible 
to view jealousy as an adaptive emotional response that evolved to help protect erotic love 
and other caring relationships by functioning as a warning about threats to them. To be sure, 
an opposing attitude emerged during the 1960s, according to which all jealousy is a sign of 
immaturity and even pathology. That difference in value perspectives mirrors, on a smaller 
scale, disagreements about the extent to which depression should be pathologized in a 
society that insists on continual cheerfulness at the workplace. I agree that today 
pathological depression is far more common than pathological jealousy, but I would also 
guess that normal depression is as commonplace as normal jealousy. In any case, here as 
elsewhere, value judgments will shape empirical investigations and interpretations.  
In concluding, I thank Dr. Ghaemi for his stimulating comments, which have strengthened 
my sense of the need for integrating moral and therapeutic perspectives. Just as therapy has 
clear moral implications, morality should become increasingly attuned to psychological 
understanding and to therapeutic values of healing and personal growth. The primary 
juncture at which that attunement occurs is moral psychology--psychology of the moral life, 
and moral aspects of psychology--a field that is only recently emerging from the shadow of 
debates about abstract ethical theories on right and wrong. Those theories themselves stand 
to benefit from greater psychological realism and nuanced integration with a compassionate 
therapeutic vision in responding to human suffering.  
Mike W. Martin (Ph.D., University of California, Irvine) is Professor of Philosophy at 
Chapman University (Orange, Calif.). His recent publications include Meaningful Work: 
Rethinking Professional Ethics (forthcoming, Oxford University Press) and Love's Virtues 
(University Press of Kansas). Currently he is working on a book integrating moral and 
therapeutic perspectives, both in theory and with regard to practical topics such as 
depression, alcoholism, gambling, and sociopathy.  
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